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1. The Problem 
In an insightful comparative study, Peter Vanhuysse showed that many OECD countries, 
especially developed democracies, score rather badly with regard to the demands of 
intergenerational justice (Vanhuysse 2013). These democracies not only score badly on 
factors such as absolute child poverty or child poverty in relation to old-age poverty but also 
have a bad score on the public debt they leave per child and their ecological footprint. 
Although this study is comparative and allows for no absolute measures, it shows that 
democracies tend to favour the interests of older age-groups and have a tendency for 
unsustainable policy decisions. 
If we follow Dennis F. Thompson, these findings can be explained by four more 
theoretical reasons (Thompson 2010: 18–20). First, there is the human tendency to prefer 
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immediate gains to those in the far future. In consequence, it is more probable that policy 
decisions showing immediate measurable results will be taken in democracy, with a rather 
short-term perspective. Second, policy decisions should be responsive to the judgements of 
citizens about the effects of laws on their interests. As a consequence, there is a tendency that 
a democracy will only accept policies which correspond in at least a minimal sense to the 
(potentially short-term) interests of the currently living. Third, political power is temporal; 
short election cycles are necessary to avoid autocracy. Thus, democracies provide an 
incentive structure favouring short-term policy with immediate gains for the living because 
these enhance the chance of staying in political power. Fourth, in democracy there is a 
tendency to favour older age groups and their interests, which leads to a focus on present 
needs that neglects ensuring similar benefits for the future. This reason can be substantiated 
empirically. Due to demographic development, the old are increasing their majority in 
democracies, which leads to the consequence that they have more voting power and are better 
represented in the political bodies. Accordingly, policy decisions tend to be biased towards 
the interests of the older members of the population.1 
In the light of anticipated environmental disasters, especially the impacts of climate 
change, this tendency of democracy to short-term decisions becomes a problem, since the 
negative impacts of these decisions will have to be borne by those who today are young (let’s 
say those who are under 25 or 30 years). To counteract this tendency, one can imagine three 
different ways to change decision-making processes in democracies, either to ensure more 
sustainable policy-making or to shift political power from the old to the young. First, one 
could introduce institutions to represent future generations. Thompson, for instance, proposes 
trustees to secure the possibility of democracy in the future. The role of these trustees would 
                                                            
1 I draw here on Vanhuysse 2013: 23–24. Interestingly enough, demographic development and an increasing 
number of older people have not only negative effects. As Dyson 2012 shows, the ageing of the citizen body 
tends to increase democratization. 
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be either to fill specific seats in the legislative assembly or to be part of a commission. In 
both cases, their task would not be to propose new policy but to voice the interests of future 
generations and to challenge those policy decisions which seem to undermine the democratic 
capacity of future generations (Thompson 2010: 26–30).2 Second, the voting system could be 
adjusted. As a consequence of his research, Vanhuysse argues in line with others that the time 
might have come to introduce proxy votes for parents. Each parent should receive an 
additional half-vote per child (Vanhuysse 2013: 41–43).3 Such a system would shift the 
voting power from the old to the young and might have as an effect that political parties 
would try to change their programmes in a way to cope better with family interests and 
perhaps with sustainable policy-making. Third, one could introduce quotas for the young in 
representative, executive, judicative or administrative bodies in democracy. 
Analysing each of these three ways to counter-act democracy’s tendency to short-term 
policy-making needs a paper length discussion. In this paper, I will only be concerned with 
the last of the three proposals. My aim is to answer the following two questions. 1. Can 
quotas be justified as a democratic means to secure better representation of the interests of the 
young? 2. Are youth quotas an effective means to ensure that decisions are taken with the 
degree of attention to environmental sustainability issues that they demand? I will answer the 
first question with a qualified “Yes!” Although quotas may be justified to secure proportional 
political representation of the young in the wake of demographic development, what I call 
“political affirmative action programmes” – the weakest form of quotas – are better suited to 
securing the political power necessary for the young to decide on the future they will have to 
face.4 The second question I will answer with a qualified “No!” Since there is a human 
                                                            
2 Another example to understand the role of representatives of future generations is provided by Ekeli 2005. 
3 For a critical normative assessment of this and other proposals to secure intergenerational justice in 
democracy, see van Parijs 1998. 
4 I explain in Section 3 what I understand by “political affirmative action programmes”. In short, they select 
candidates from disadvantaged social groups for offices if they gain equal or similar voting power, rather than a 
candidate from an advantaged social group. 
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tendency to favour immediate gains over ones that are more distant in time, it is implausible 
to believe that the young will fare better than the old. But ensuring more adequate 
representation of the young enhances the legitimacy of the long-term impacts of policy 
decisions taken today. Those who have to face the consequences should be appropriately 
included in the decisions taken. 
To answer my two questions more fully, we first need to know what quotas are and 
what they can achieve. In the second section, I will introduce quotas as they have been 
discussed in political theory with regard to the principle of equality of opportunity. I argue 
that quotas can only be justified as a means of reaching less discriminatory selection 
procedures for social positions, but that they cannot be justified as a normative goal in 
themselves. We also need to be clear about the role quotas could probably serve within a 
democratic institutional framework. In the third section, I show under what conditions quotas 
can be justified in democracy as a means of achieving proportional representation of all the 
different interests in society. These clarifications allow section four to answer the question 
whether quotas for the young can be justified in democracy. Answering this first question 
enables us to move on in section five to my second question, whether youth quotas can be an 
effective means to secure environmentally sustainable policy-making.  
 
2. What Are Quotas and What Can Quotas Achieve? 
The 1970s witnessed a heated debate not only among politicians but also among political 
theorists about whether and on what grounds quotas can be justified in the job market and the 
educational system. This question has often been dealt with as if quotas were either a 
normative goal in themselves or necessary to understand the principle of equality of 
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opportunity.5 I oppose both these understandings of quotas.6 Instead, I argue in this section 
that quotas can only be understood as a means either to realize equality of opportunity or to 
serve a goal beyond non-discriminatory selection procedures. 
Selection procedures for jobs, educational places, or social positions more generally 
always discriminate, since from the pool of candidates they select the number of individuals 
needed to fill the positions in question. According to a formal understanding of equality of 
opportunity, such discrimination is justified under the condition that only characteristics of 
candidates who are suitable are considered to fill the position under consideration. In other 
words, only those characteristics of candidates which enhance the prospect of successful 
performance of a social position should be taken into account (Sher 1988). All other criteria 
which might play a role in selecting candidates are a form of unjustified discrimination. 
Women, for example, are unjustifiably but not explicitly discriminated against by selection 
procedures which demand that one must have worked without any breaks for the last five 
years in the company to gain a position in management. This discriminates against all those 
women who are of child-bearing age. Furthermore, as Mary Anne Warren argues, such 
selection procedures reinforce social structures which expect women to stay at home and 
maintain the household (Warren 1977: 245–249). 
Understanding equality of opportunity in this way allows us to expect that, if formal 
equality of opportunity is fully realized for the educational system and the job market then 
both genders and all different ethnical, religious and other social groups are proportionally 
represented in all different kinds of social positions. Put differently, assuming that a society 
can be divided into different social and economic strata to which specific social positions are 
                                                            
5 For a helpful overview of the debate see Rössler 1993. 
6 For a more developed argument to justify my view see Wallimann-Helmer 2013: esp. chap. 2. 
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attached, then members of all different social groups in a society with full formal equality of 
opportunity fill positions in proportion to their number in the society as a whole.  
Such an understanding of equality of opportunity has been proposed most explicitly 
by Onora O’Neill. According to her, the fairest selection procedure is a lottery, since in a 
lottery all have equal chances of success. Thus, to be a fair procedure of selection, equality of 
opportunity should guarantee equal chances of success in education and the job market 
(O'Neill 1976: 338). As a consequence, nothing else can result than proportional 
representation of both genders and all social groups in all social positions attached to the 
different socio-economic strata of society.  
To ensure that such a proportional distribution of social position is the case, O’Neill 
proposes to reformulate the principle of equality of opportunity more substantially. Equality 
of opportunity should be understood as demanding that social positions be divided between 
all social groups of society in a proportional way (O'Neill 1976: 339–340). This 
understanding of equality of opportunity establishes a first and strongest understanding of 
quotas: rigid quotas. Rigid quotas demand that educational places and jobs are distributed in a 
strictly proportional way. Such an understanding of quotas presupposes that unjustified 
discrimination is in place and that equality of opportunity is only realized if a proportional 
distribution of social positions on all social strata of society occurs. To make this 
presupposition more concrete and not to use a probably biased language, it is useful to have a 
closer look at the famous example of a warrior society introduced by Bernard Williams 
(1973: 244). 
Imagine a society in which high prestige is attached to the status of warrior. 
Traditionally, these warriors have been selected from certain wealthy families of society but 
not from the poor majority. Such a procedure of selection is certainly unjustifiably 
discriminatory against the poor majority if we presume that wealth and membership of a 
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certain class of families is irrelevant to performing well as a warrior. It would be more 
appropriate, Williams suggests, to introduce a competition to test the physical strength of 
those who want to be warriors. If such a selection procedure is adopted and no explicit or 
implicit unjustified discrimination against the majority of society occurs, then it is reasonable 
to assume that after some time the warrior class will consist of members of the wealthy 
families and of the poor majority in proportion to their number in society. 
However, as O’Neill has already noted, there are two difficulties involved in this 
argument (O'Neill 1976: 339–340). First, it may not necessarily be the case that members of 
both parts of society have the capacity to develop the equivalent capacities required to be 
successful in the competition. From an egalitarian point of view, it would certainly be 
objectionable to depend on wealth, social class, religion or ethnic differences to justify 
unequal capacity. However, differences in wealth and social circumstances can become 
relevant for how well people are able to develop their natural talents. A wealthy family can 
provide better training, equipment and assistance. Social circumstances can be more or less 
supportive. These are reasons to justify a more substantive understanding of equality of 
opportunity. But this understanding – most commonly, according to Rawls, called fair 
equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971: 73–74) – does not justify quotas in a rigid sense. It only 
denotes the conditions which must be secured for all to have a fair chance of success at the 
outset of the competition. What must be ensured is that social and economic circumstances 
do not constrain in any relevant sense the opportunities available to all members of society. 
Second, it is not at all clear that the willingness of all members in society to become 
warriors is distributed evenly over all social groups. There might be a significant proportion 
of the majority who hold pacifist convictions. If this is the case, members of this social group 
will neither be motivated to prepare for the competition nor will they necessarily take part 
unless coerced to do so. Therefore, although it might be the case that fair conditions to 
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prepare for the competition are given, if the willingness to become a warrior is unevenly 
distributed in society, it is very likely that a disproportional distribution of warrior positions 
will be the result. Only as many members of the majority can be successful as are willing to 
apply for warrior positions. Since in a liberal order no one would be ready to justify coercion 
to apply for social positions in higher social and economic strata of society, it seems to be 
more plausible to propose a less rigid, to wit a weaker form of quotas. 
This weaker form of quotas, weak quotas for short, takes into account the fact that the 
willingness to achieve positions of higher and the highest social and economic strata is 
unevenly distributed amongst the different social groups in society. But it also assumes that 
unjustified discrimination against some social groups still occurs. Therefore, it must be 
ensured that successful applicants from the pool of candidates are proportional to how many 
individuals have applied from the different social groups in society (Warren 1977: 251–253). 
To use Williams’s example once more, if it is the case that for 120 positions as warriors 80 
candidates are from wealthy families and 160 from the poor majority of society apply, then 
these 120 positions should be divided in a ratio of 1:2. Forty warrior positions should be 
assigned to candidates from wealthier families, and 80 should go to candidates from the poor 
majority. When such a distribution does not occur, it could be argued that unjustified 
discrimination is the case. 
Thus, this understanding of quotas once again presupposes the occurrence of 
unjustified discrimination, but it takes for granted that not all members of society are equally 
willing to apply for warrior positions. Such a justification of quotas, however, faces a further 
difficulty which would also be faced by rigid quotas. If it is demanded that a strict 
proportional distribution of positions among successful applicants must be secured, then it 
might be the case that the positions would have to be assigned to members of a particular 
social group even if they are not as well qualified to fill the positions as applicants from other 
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social groups. This is the problem of reverse discrimination. To ensure a more proportional 
distribution of positions, a selection procedure would have to unjustifiably discriminate 
against candidates from those social groups which in the past were unjustifiably advantaged.7 
This must be judged as an unjustified discrimination, since what becomes relevant to 
realize the requirements of weak quotas are characteristics which are deemed irrelevant for 
the successful performance of the position. Discriminating against better qualified candidates 
in the name of quotas means to take into account characteristics such as gender, ethnicity or 
religion, which, for example, are not relevant for becoming a warrior. Warriors need to 
display sufficient physical condition. For physical condition, at least in principle, gender, 
ethnicity and religion are irrelevant. This holds true, however, only when physical condition 
is not shaped in a significant sense by these aspects of the candidates’ backgrounds. Indeed, it 
could be argued that gender, ethnicity and perhaps even religious socialization significantly 
constrain the physical condition of candidates. But if only physical strength is relevant for 
becoming a warrior, then it becomes difficult to argue that unjustified discrimination occurs 
even if the distribution of warrior positions is not proportional to the genders, ethnicities and 
religious groups in the warrior society. 
There are two further arguments though to justify quotas which would not be in 
trouble with this last challenge since they justify quotas with a purpose beyond selection 
procedures for social positions. First, it can be argued that role models are a suitable means to 
change discriminatory attitudes in society and to motivate members of disadvantaged social 
groups to apply for social positions in higher social and economic strata.8 According to this 
argument, quotas are justified to create these role models to reach both projected outcomes. 
Second, it can be argued that quotas are a justified means to enhance the quality of decisions 
                                                            
7 For two classical texts discussing reverse discrimination see Newton 1973 and Dworkin 1977: 269–288. 
8 This argument has been made in various forms. The first philosopher stating it was to my knowledge Thomson 
1973. 
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taken in higher ranked social positions. In this sense quotas are understood as a means to 
improve the economy or society as a whole.9 Neither of these arguments, however, 
necessarily justify rigid or weak quotas, since to be in accordance with these demands it 
would also be appropriate to select in favour of disadvantaged social groups if they are 
equally qualified for a social position. This would be a claim for an even weaker form of 
quotas than those discussed above. For the purpose of this paper I will name it “affirmative 
action”.10 
Either way, whatever form of quotas we think to be appropriate, I think they can only 
be justified as a means to overcome unjustifiably discriminatory selection procedures. The 
main reason for this belief can be found in the presumption I mentioned. For quotas to be 
justified, more or less explicitly unjustifiably discriminating practices must be in place. If this 
condition is not given or at least counterfactually presumed, it is not possible to argue for 
quotas. If a selection procedure is fair and does not display any explicit or hidden form of 
unjustified discrimination, then whatever distribution occurs must be accepted as fair. 
Furthermore, the arguments from role models and an improved economy or society show that 
quotas are only justified if they arrive at the projected goal. Role models have to be an 
effective means to change discriminatory attitudes in society and more diversity in higher-
ranked social positions must be shown to be an appropriate means to improve the economy or 
society. This can certainly be correct, but it is only under these conditions that quotas are 
justified. And since these arguments take quotas to be a means to reach these ends, they are 
instruments – but seem not to be normative goals in themselves. 
                                                            
9 One of the recent statements of this argument with regard to education is provided by Anderson 2007. 
10 In calling this weakest form of quotas “affirmative action” I come close to at least some aspects of what 
Pojman discussed under the label “weak quotas” (Pojman 1998). However, I am also aware that “affirmative 
action” broadly understood could denote any kind of preferential treatment of disadvantaged social groups 
which must not necessarily be linked with the idea of quotas. 
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In addition, arguing for proportional representation of all social groups of society in 
all different social and economic strata in society presupposes that the willingness to apply 
for these positions is evenly distributed among all social groups. This makes it necessary to 
ensure substantial conditions to secure that neither social nor economic differences have a 
significant impact on how successful members of different social groups are in education and 
the job market. However, these conditions do not depend on the distributive result but the 
pre-conditions securing fair preparation for all to be successful. Thus, they cannot justify 
quotas, but they do justify an understanding of equality of opportunity which also secures 
these conditions. With these considerations in mind, let us now turn to the question how 
quotas could become relevant in democracy.  
 
3. In What Sense Can Quotas Become Relevant in Democracy? 
To see in what sense quotas can become relevant in democracy, it is necessary to be clear 
about their proper role in such an institutional regime. For this purpose, I think it is helpful 
not to dig too deeply into different understandings of what democracy is and what 
institutional framework it demands. I think it is enough to consider a rather formal 
understanding of democracy and, more specifically, of representative democracy. As we will 
see in this section, quotas are only appropriate if applied to political institutions and their 
offices but not to policy decisions themselves. But what is democracy and how can its 
institutional framework be justified? 
To understand what democracy is, it is helpful to introduce the description of 
democratic government expressed in Lincoln’s famous phrase in his Gettysburg address that 
democracy is “government of the people, by the people, for the people (…)” (Brooks Lapsley 
2012). Although it remains unclear in Lincoln’s statement who exactly legitimately 
constitutes the people and on what normative grounds one may be considered part of the 
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people, it clarifies how political theorists usually understand democracy. Democracy is an 
institutional regime in which the whole citizen body, the people of society, governs itself by 
making and executing decisions and taking responsibility for their consequences in a body.  
The liberal Western tradition of political theory has found several different ways of 
normatively justifying the right to democratic government. What all these theories have in 
common, however, is the presumption that human beings are and have to be respected as free 
and equal. To respect human beings as free, their right to liberty cannot be restricted without 
giving them a say in the political process leading to such restrictions. To respect them as 
equal, it is necessary to ensure fair chances for all to participate in this decision-making 
process. How having a say and a fair chance to participate in the decision-making process 
must be secured is a matter of theoretical dispute. But nowadays, it is almost impossible to 
defend any political institutional framework without accepting the right of all citizens to be 
respected as free and equal (Kymlicka 2002: 3f.). 
Indeed, to argue for quotas it is necessary to assume a more substantial goal of 
democracy beyond securing formal conditions of free and equal participation in political 
decision-making. Without such a more substantial goal it becomes difficult to see what 
unjustified discrimination in the process of democratic decision-making means.11 Thomas 
Christiano for example suggests, in a democratic regime it must be assured that all human 
beings are equally respected in their interests. This is only possible if all members of society 
“on whom the rules [the policy decisions] have a major impact” are equally involved in 
determining the decision (Christiano 2010: 56). It must be possible for all to participate in 
                                                            
11 To be sure, in democratic theory it is a contested issue whether democracy should be understood only in 
procedural or also in more substantive terms (e.g. Buchanan 2002; Brettschneider 2005; Christiano 2004; 
Brettschneider 2005, 2007; van Parijs 2011). In this paper it is not possible to justify the view that genuine 
democracy should also incorporate a more substantive goal. However, as should become clear in the following a 
more substantive goal of democracy like the one suggested by Christiano is a necessary presumption in order to 
make possible an argument for quotas in democracy. I would like to thank Nenad Stojanovic for raising this 
issue. 
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political decision-making, and they must be able to see that their interests are respected; what 
is necessary for policy decisions to be legitimate, therefore, is their public justifiability. 
Following Christiano, democracy is the best institutional framework to guarantee this 
condition of public scrutiny, at least partially (Christiano 2004: 275). In this sense then, a 
democratic institutional order not only secures formal participation in collective decision-
making for all citizens but also serves the purpose of balancing interests and of avoiding 
policy-making biased in favour of some interests at the cost of others. Thus, in democracy 
unjustified discrimination means a tendency for biased decisions in favour of some interests 
neglecting certain others. 
Following on from this, one would expect that, provided the formal conditions to 
secure free and equal citizenship are present, repeated policy decisions will display the 
different interests existing in society proportionally. In a society with ten pacifists and five 
warriors, we expect that every third policy decision will be in favour of the warriors whilst 
two of the three decisions are in favour of pacifism. However, to argue that quotas for the 
interests served by policy decisions are appropriate if this is not the case seems to be a 
misconception of what democracy is. First, although democracy can be viewed as a system to 
prevent biased policy, it still remains a process of collective decision-making which ideally 
leads to consent or compromise about what is in the common interest of all members of 
society. Second, according to Lincoln’s description of democracy as “government of the 
people, by the people, for the people” it must be the citizen body that decides in its own right. 
Any substantial criteria prescribing in what proportion policy decisions have to display 
existing interests in society would be in conflict with this description of democracy. 
According to these two arguments, therefore, it seems to be inappropriate to apply quotas to 
policy decisions themselves. It is more reasonable to apply them to the composition of 
political bodies steering a society. 
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If it is the composition of the political bodies of democracy to which quotas must be 
applied, we have to understand in what way it can be justified that only a certain number of 
citizens fill the relevant offices. I think here it again proves helpful to return to Lincoln’s 
description of democracy as “government of the people, by the people, for the people (…)”. 
According to this statement, policy decisions in a democracy are legitimate only on the 
condition that it is the whole citizen body that governs in its own right. Whether a model of 
democracy is a model of direct or representative democracy depends on whether the whole 
citizen body or only part of it is conceived as necessary to make policy decisions (Christiano 
2010: 246). Models of direct democracy argue that the people who should make policy 
decisions must be coextensive with the whole citizen body. In representative democracy, the 
assembly making policy decisions can be smaller. Thus, to capture the understanding of 
representative democracy, Lincoln’s phrase needs a slight reformulation: Democracy is 
government of all the people, by some representatives of the people, for all the people. 
Representative institutions thus understood are an institutional way to operationalize the 
process of collective decision-making among all the people so as to make it more efficient 
and even, according to some views, qualitatively better (e.g. Christiano 2010: 105; Pettit 
2004: 60–62; Dobson 1997: 127).  
According to this formal description of representative democracy, legitimate 
representation must take into account all interests present in the citizen body (Dovi 2011; 
Mansbrige 2003). Furthermore, the members of the legislative assembly must be accountable 
to the people forming the citizen body since they should decide in the name of the citizen 
body as whole. In democracy, accountability is usually ensured by election cycles, because 
these allow those representatives who performed well in representing interests to be re-
elected and those who performed badly to be deselected (Rehfeld 2006). Thus, representation 
in democracy can only be legitimate if it is supported by the interests actually present in the 
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citizen body. Therefore, the function of the legislative assembly is to represent the interests 
present in proportion to their weight in the citizen body. The function of an individual 
representative, by contrast, is to stand or act for those whom he or she represents. This means 
that, in a society with 1000 pacifists and 500 warriors, an assembly of six individuals would 
be legitimate if it contained four representatives of the pacifists and two representatives of the 
warriors. In consequence, it can be argued that in representative democracy unjustified 
discrimination occurs if such proportional representation of interests is absent or, at least, if 
certain interests are permanently marginalized. 
The legislative assembly is certainly the most obvious institution in a democratic 
framework to proportionally represent the interests of the citizen body, since in the end all 
policy decisions must be confirmed by this institution. However, it is not only the legislative 
assembly which has a major impact on how the interests of the citizen body are taken into 
account and enforced. Executive, judiciary and administrative bodies also have significant 
impact. Since the legislative assembly must represent the present interests in society 
proportionally, and these other institutions have a major impact on how well they are 
translated into policy, then these institutions would also have to fulfil this representative 
requirement. But there are two practical reasons why the legislative assembly is not only the 
most important but also the most plausible political body for which to demand proportional 
representation of interests. Admittedly, these reasons do not exclude a justification of a 
proportional representation of interests in executive, judiciary and administrative bodies. 
First, with regard to the judiciary and the administrative body, individuals in these 
offices not only have to be regarded by the citizens to best represent their interests. For 
successful performance in these offices, other competences are needed. Lawyers need to have 
sufficient knowledge of jurisprudence; a specific function in the administrative body 
demands specific qualifications for its fulfilment. Therefore, it would not only be the case 
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that those filling these offices have to perform well in representing interests present in the 
citizen body but must also display the relevant competences. How this necessity of 
competence should be balanced with the fact that individuals filling these positions should 
also serve certain interests is a complicated question that I cannot answer here.  
Second, there is a different practical difficulty with regard to the executive. Executive 
offices are not as numerous as seats in the legislative assembly. This makes it difficult to 
demand that executive organs should represent all interests present in society proportionally. 
However, if a society is divided into large ethnic, religious, linguistic or geographic groups 
with conflicting interests, it seems reasonable to argue at least for proportional representation 
of these groups in society. But this makes it necessary to be clear about the relevance of these 
groups and their interests. To justify the proportional representation of interests in the 
executive organs, it has to be shown why the conflicting interests of certain social groups 
bear such high relevance that the executive should be divided accordingly. This is a central 
question to be clarified in the next section, in which I try to answer the question whether 
youth quotas can be justified. 
Against the background of the considerations concerning democracy thus far, we can 
now see in what sense quotas can become relevant in a democracy. They can become relevant 
to ensure that all interests in the citizen body are represented proportionally. Quotas can be 
seen as justified means if it becomes apparent that some interests are permanently 
marginalized within election procedures for the legislative assembly or selection procedures 
for other offices in other democratic institutions. Such marginalization represents a sort of 
unjustified discrimination against those holding these interests. However, as we have seen in 
the last section, this does not mean that quotas are a justified normative goal in themselves. 
They are only justified as a means to prevent more or less explicit unjustified discrimination 
in the election and selection procedures for the offices in question. If no such discrimination 
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occurs, whatever distribution of offices results must be accepted as legitimate. Furthermore, 
since in a democracy these procedures are the only way of legitimizing the representation of 
interests, the resulting distribution of offices has to be accepted as proportionally representing 
the interests in society. 
 
4. Can Youth Quotas Be Justified? 
As I have introduced the relevance of quotas in democracy thus far, they are only justified as 
a means to bring about election and selection procedures which do not unjustifiably 
discriminate against some interests in society. This makes it necessary that a marginalization 
of some interests is actually occurring. If this is not the case, then it is not possible to argue 
for quotas. To assess whether in democracy quotas for the young can be justified to ensure 
appropriate representation of their interests, we need to deal with another complication. It 
must be possible to show that the young indeed constitute a relevant social group with 
specific interests. Otherwise, it becomes difficult to argue for youth quotas as a means to 
ensure policy-making that is less biased against the young. 
In light of Vanhuysse’s study, it seems reasonable to argue that the young are 
marginalized in their interests. In addition, due to demographic development and the 
conceptual condition that democracies have to be responsive to the interests of the citizen 
body, it is also reasonable to assume that democracies tend to favour the interests of the old 
rather than the interests of the young. Both these empirical arguments justify the conclusion 
that democracies tend to marginalize, to wit unjustifiably discriminate against, the interests of 
the young. However, this argument only holds under the condition that the young applying 
for offices are or have unjustifiably been discriminated against in the selection or election 
procedures for the offices in question. If this were not the case, then quotas as a means to 
bring about non-discriminatory election or selection procedures could not be justified. 
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If this pre-condition is a given, then it is possible to explore further whether and under 
what conditions youth quotas can be justified. As mentioned above with regard to executive 
bodies, to argue for quotas for specific social groups in democracy makes it necessary to 
specify which kinds of social groups can become relevant here. According to the definition of 
democracy I draw on here, it seems to be unjustifiable to make mere membership of a social 
group more relevant for the right to proportional representation than the interests present in 
society potentially crossing the borders of these social groups. In consequence, to argue for 
proportional representation of social groups rather than the weight of interests present in 
society it must be possible to show that membership in a social group is a necessary condition 
for representing the special interests of that social group. Furthermore, it must be the case that 
a social group is sufficiently homogeneous to be ascribed certain specific interests which are 
not represented by non-members of these groups.12 
This challenge is especially pertinent considering the young as a social group. It is not 
at all clear that being young is a necessary and sufficient condition to have certain specific 
interests. This for two reasons. First, similar to other social groups divided according to 
gender, ethnicity, language or geography it is difficult to show that membership in such a 
group is sufficient to denote certain specific interests. Second, the interests that the young 
will have will highly depend on their various social, economic, cultural and educational 
backgrounds. These backgrounds will not necessarily lead to a set of interests shared by all 
who are young but to various kinds of interests not specifically linked to their age. Therefore, 
it becomes difficult to argue that being young is a significant condition to represent specific 
interests. 
However, if we take into account that it is not interests by themselves which ground 
specific political opinions and ideals but the discourses within which one is involved, it is 
                                                            
12 A more developed discussion of this problem can be found in Stojanovic 2013: 133–140. 
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possible to argue that the young form a social group united enough to justify their 
proportional representation. John Dryzeck and Simon Niemeyer have argued in this direction 
(Dryzek und Niemeyer 2008). According to them, what is relevant in democracy is not that 
interests are proportionally represented but discourses, because discourses are the basis on 
which interests are formed. Since the young have their own specific discourses, it seems to be 
plausible that they form a social group that can be represented proportionally. They have their 
own way to communicate and articulate their hopes and fears, and they consider political 
challenges their own way. If one argues along these lines, therefore, it becomes possible to 
view the young as a relevant social group to be represented proportionally.13 
Once the young or other groups are established as relevant social groups to be 
represented proportionally, a further difficulty arises. For their representation to be legitimate, 
to wit not in conflict with Lincoln’s description of democracy, social groups can only demand 
representation in proportion to their weight in the citizen body. Larger social groups or parts 
of society are entitled to more weight in political bodies than smaller groups. The reason for 
this is simply that representation of interests in democracy must be proportional to the weight 
these groups have in society. To argue for more than such proportional representation would 
need further arguments leading beyond the relevance of quotas in democracy I have argued 
for thus far. Thus, according to the justification of quotas up to now, quotas to ensure non-
discriminatory selection and election procedures for offices can demand nothing more than 
the proportional representation of discourses or interests and, if possible to justify, of social 
groups. This challenge proves to be especially pertinent with regard to quotas for the young, 
since their plausibility not only stems from the fact that their discourses tend to be 
marginalized but also because demographic development enforces their marginalization. 
                                                            
13 In addition, an argument along these lines implies that one would have to alter the understanding of 
democracy and its relevant representative institutions overall. It would not only have to be the discourse of the 
young which would have to be represented proportionally; it would also have to be all kinds of discourses 
present in society and not interests. 
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Quotas as justified thus far cannot solve this problem. This shows why it is especially 
important to carefully assess which form of quotas would be most appropriate for the young.  
With regard to the three different forms of quotas discussed in the second section, it is 
not at all clear that quotas in democracy should always be rigid. It depends on circumstances 
and especially on the motivation of members of social groups which form of quotas is 
appropriate. Rigid quotas are only justified if the groups to be represented proportionally can 
always nominate enough candidates to effectively fill the positions. If this is not the case, 
rigid quotas would demand coercive practices for those groups which are not able to 
nominate enough candidates to conform to the proportional requirement. As in the case for 
rigid quotas with regard to equality of opportunity, this makes it seem more plausible to 
propose weak quotas which only demand that the different relevant groups are elected and 
selected in a proportional way from those applying for offices.  
How effective such weak quotas can be to transfer interests into policy, however, 
depends on the weight of those groups for which proportional representation is ensured by 
quotas. If a social group does not have enough weight to significantly influence policy 
decisions, quotas for proportional representation cannot serve the purpose for which they are 
proposed. Although quotas can serve small minorities to better voice their interests 
(stemming from their discourses), it is not at all clear that this has a relevant impact on the 
policy decisions taken.14  
With these considerations in mind, we see that in certain circumstances political 
affirmative action programmes and securing substantial assistance for political activity prove 
more promising than rigid or weak quotas. Political affirmative action programmes would 
                                                            
14 Dryzek and Niemeyer by contrast argue that the frequency with which interests can be and are voiced have a 
major impact on policy decisions (Dryzek und Niemeyer 2008: 484). If one assumes that voiced beliefs alter 
political discourse, then – irrespective of the proportion of society minorities constitute – any kind of 
proportional representation will improve their situation. However, although voicing beliefs can have an impact 
on the formation of policy decisions when the chips are down, for final decisions the decisive power still lies 
with the larger social groups and not minorities. 
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demand that whenever two candidates or parties gain the same or similar votes, the candidate 
or party belonging to a disadvantaged social group, or proposing more candidates from these 
groups, is preferred. Substantive assistance, on the other hand, would mean that potentially 
marginalized social groups are assisted by society in their development of political 
programmes and financially to be able to voice their views on an equal footing with those 
interest groups which are economically better situated.15 Both measures would not only 
increase the likelihood that the interests of these minorities are heard; they would also allow 
these minorities to gain more political influence than they would be proportionally entitled to, 
since if minorities are able to better voice their beliefs this also increases the likelihood of 
their political success when applying for offices.  
I think – especially for the young – both these kinds of measures will prove the most 
promising. Political affirmative action programmes will provide incentives for older political 
leaders and parties to support the young in their political career earlier and with more 
intensity than they tend to do now. With political affirmative action programmes it becomes 
interesting for parties to have younger candidates on their lists since that increases the 
likelihood of being successful in cases in which they have equal or similar citizen support 
than other parties. Furthermore, if candidates on the lists are elected individually, political 
affirmative action programmes enhance the chance to gather more seats. In any case in which 
two candidates, from whatever party they are, gain an equal or similar number of votes, the 
younger candidate will be given advantage. Substantial assistance for the young, by contrast, 
would allow the young to politically organize and to campaign for their interests in a way 
they would not be able to without this help, since it is certainly a fact that older people have 
more experience in how to organize and have more capital at their disposal for political 
campaigning. 
                                                            
15 Such a proposal along these lines is for example made by Young 1990. 
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Taken together, the considerations of this section allow the following conclusions. 
Quotas for social groups can be justified in democracy if there is marginalization or 
unjustified discrimination of the specific interests or discourses of these groups. This 
presupposes that specific interests or discourses and the ability to voice them are sufficiently 
closely linked with being a member of that social group in question. Against this backdrop, 
quotas for the young can be justified since the young are obviously discriminated against, and 
if they in fact constitute a discrete social group. Whether rigid or weak quotas or political 
affirmative action programmes would better serve the purpose of avoiding the 
marginalization of the young and other social groups, however, remains a question to be 
answered depending on the motivation for political action of members of a social group and 
especially on the kind of social group in question. In case of the young, I suggested, political 
affirmative action programmes and substantial assistance might prove more effective than 
rigid or weak quotas. 
 
5. Are Quotas a Means to Avoid Future Disasters? 
Thus far, I have argued that quotas for the young can be justified, but that it depends on 
circumstances what form of quotas is appropriate. If enough young people are motivated to 
engage in politics, then rigid quotas for representative bodies can be justified. To avoid 
potential coercion to fulfil this proportional requirement, however, it seems more appropriate 
to propose weak quotas. Furthermore, since due to demographic development the young tend 
to be outnumbered, it might be better to adopt political affirmative action programmes 
favouring young candidates whenever they have equal or similar votes to older candidates. 
These programmes would allow a greater shift in political influence to the young than their 
number in society. However, whatever form of quotas is adopted, can they ensure that not 
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only the interests and discourses of the young are better represented but also that the goal of 
more long-term policy-making is addressed? 
To begin with, there are two obvious reasons to doubt that this question can be 
answered in the affirmative. First, it is not necessarily membership in a social group that 
makes individuals better suited to represent particular interests or discourses (Mansbrige 
1999: 638). It is not only warriors who can represent the interests of warriors. Pacifists can do 
the same if they care sufficiently enough for the interest of, say, adequate housing for 
warriors. And warriors can certainly represent the interests of pacifists if they argue against 
the duty to become a warrior. Thus, although the concerns Vanhuysse expresses are concerns 
of the young, it is not at all clear that young citizens will care for them once in office. It is not 
at all clear that young representatives will represent interests in lower public debt and 
sustainable policy-making. Young people might be occupied with other things – those things 
which are relevant to their current situation of life. Therefore, it might be the case that older 
people will take better care of what is in the long-term interests of the young. This makes it 
possible to conclude that quotas do not necessarily serve the purpose of ensuring more 
sustainable policy-making.  
Second, as argued in the last section, if quotas only serve the purpose of ensuring 
proportional representation and outweigh the marginalization of interests or discourses, then 
greater representation of social groups than their proportion in society cannot be justified. 
Since due to demographic development the young are increasingly a minority, there is no 
guarantee that their proportional representation will alter policy decisions in a significant 
way. This might even be the case if political affirmative action programmes are adopted, 
because they leave it open to how politics goes whether the young will be successful in 
transferring their interests into policy. Thus, even though the young might care strongly about 
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long-term policy-making, and their proportional representation allows them to better voice 
their beliefs, it is not a given that quotas will lead to more sustainable policy decisions.  
In light of these two arguments, to enhance the capacity of the young to ensure long-
term decision-making, it seems more appropriate to bring further arguments to justify quotas 
in democracy than those provided up to now. Two of these further arguments rely on two 
justifications of quotas introduced in section two; both leading beyond the goal of ensuring 
non-discriminatory selection procedures. First, parallel to the argument for role models, it 
could be argued that quotas could serve the purpose of motivating members of disadvantaged 
groups to engage more in politics, since once some members of a social group are elected 
they could serve as role models. If these role models care for sustainable policy-making or 
lowering public debt, then the young as a group might care more for these questions and 
influence policy-making accordingly. Second, it could be argued in favour of quotas that 
more diversity in political bodies enhances the quality of policy decisions, whatever they 
might be. Third, and going beyond the arguments introduced in section two, it would also be 
possible to argue that the long-term impacts of policy decisions taken today would be better 
legitimized if those who have to bear them shared proportional decisive weight. 
What we must be clear about in applying these arguments, however, is that they shift 
the purpose quotas should serve. As I have discussed youth quotas up to now, they have been 
justified as a means to prevent or avoid marginalization or unjustified discrimination of the 
young as a social group. In contrast, quotas in these arguments become a means to different 
ends. Quotas for the sake of role models are a means of achieving more political sensitivity, 
and if these role models care for long-term interests, then they can enhance awareness of 
these challenges. In the case of the second argument, quotas are introduced as a means of 
enhancing the quality of policy decisions. More diversity, it is argued, will lead to more 
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creative policy outcomes and to decisions that better mirror what is in the common interest.16 
Third, better representation of the young can serve as a means to better guarantee the 
legitimacy of policy decisions and their long-term impacts. 
As plausible as these arguments sound by themselves, I do not think that they can 
justify more than proportional representation of social groups. Whatever purpose role models 
are able to serve, in democracy quotas are only justifiable up to the point at which positions 
are filled in relation to the proportion that interests or discourse are present in society. To 
demand more would mean to subvert the ideal of democracy as I have expressed it in this 
paper. The same is true with regard to the argument that quotas might help enhance the 
quality of policy decisions. Although it might be correct that more diversity enhances the 
quality of policy decisions, demanding more than proportional representation of social groups 
would once again mean subverting the idea of legitimate representation in democracy. These 
considerations become especially relevant with regard to the last argument since, if quotas are 
a means to enhance the legitimacy of the long-term impacts of policy decisions, then they 
have to be proportional. According to Lincoln’s description of democracy, to argue for quotas 
in any other sense would be illegitimate. 
Furthermore, these three additional arguments in favour of quotas also face the second 
challenge mentioned above. It is not necessarily the case that young role models will care 
about those interests denoted by Vanhuysse as the interests of the young. And although more 
diversity might lead to a better quality of policy decisions, it must remain an open question 
what such better quality would be. In democracy, it must be the citizen body as a whole who 
should decide what good policy decisions are, since it is the political body which is 
accountable to itself. Any qualitative criteria prescribing how a society has to decide would 
be in conflict with the conditions of legitimacy in democracy. Therefore, although 
                                                            
16 For this argument see for example Dryzek und Niemeyer 2008: 484; Young 1990. 
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proportional representation of the young might enhance the legitimacy of long-term impacts 
of policy decisions taken today, this does not mean that the decisions must and will further 
specific and especially long-term goals. 
With regard to the last additional argument for quotas, there is at least one reason 
which only justifies a qualified “No” to answer the second question I have investigated here. 
Since the long-term consequences of policy decisions have to be borne by today’s young, 
enhancing their legitimacy is important. Those who have to bear these long-term 
consequences should also have appropriate weight in deciding whether or not to take the risks 
involved in these decisions. This makes it reasonable to argue that youth quotas are justified 
because they enhance the legitimacy of long-term policy consequences. But they cannot be 
justified with regard to any substantial policy goal, such as lowering public debt or 
sustainability. Once again, whether enhanced legitimacy in this sense is best realized via rigid 
or weak quotas or via political affirmative action programmes depends on how the motivation 
for political engagement is distributed among the young. As argued in the last section, with 
regard to demographic development there is good reason to argue for the last and weakest 
form of quotas in combination with substantial political assistance for the young. If the young 
are successful in politics, both these measures would facilitate more than proportional 
political influence of the young, which would enhance the legitimacy of the long-term 
impacts of policy decisions taken today. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued for four conclusions. First, quotas are not normative goals in 
themselves but only a means: first and foremost a means to ensure the absence of more or 
less hidden unjustified discrimination. Second, in democracy quotas are most plausibly used 
as a means to fill offices in those bodies which have a major impact on how well interests or 
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discourses are translated into policy. Quotas for the legislative assembly are therefore most 
important. Third, quotas for the young can be justified since, due to demographic 
development, their discourses tend to be marginalized. What form of quotas is most 
appropriate to serve this purpose remains an open question. It depends on the motivation of 
the young for political engagement which form best serves their better integration in the 
political process. I suggested that political affirmative action programmes together with 
substantial political assistance for the young might prove most promising. Fourth, quotas 
cannot be justified as a means to ensure long-term policy-making, but they can ensure better 
legitimacy of the long-term impacts of policy decisions taken today. In the light of challenges 
such as high pubic debts, environmental disasters and climate change, it is this last argument 
which best justifies quotas for the young. 
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